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person presenting it. That, surely, is a good 
thing. But biometrics are not a security 
panacea that will single-handedly wipe out 
all illegal immigration, terrorism, organised 
crime, and benefit fraud.
Biometrics have vociferous critics, 
invasion of privacy being the most 
common objection. BAA planned to 
fingerprint all passengers (some four 
million a year) using Heathrow’s new 
Terminal 5, but had to hold off when the 
Information Commissioner’s Office – roused 
into action by privacy campaigners – 
announced that this might constitute a 
breach of the Data Protection Act. Other 
biometric schemes are likely to provoke 
similar protests in the future.
Of even greater concern is the fact that 
biometric tests do not guarantee security 
as some of their advocates make out.  
A key problem is that, to detect a terrorist 
or criminal, you have to know they are 
one. If you don’t know Carlos the Jackal is a 
terrorist, and he turns up with a biometric 
passport that matches his fingerprint, he’ll 
go undetected. Even if Carlos the Jackal is 
known to be a terrorist, he might obtain a 
passport that matches his fingerprint under 
the name ‘John Smith’. 
Biometrics can also be spoofed. Carlos 
the Jackal might kidnap John Smith, take 
his passport, and make a silicone copy of 
his fingerprint. In the movie Gattaca, Ethan 
Hawke’s character uses this technique to 
assume the identity of the character played 
by Jude Law; in the real world, it has been 
shown that fingerprint systems can indeed 
be fooled by someone putting a silicone 
layer with someone else’s fingerprint over 
their own. Most famously, a Japanese 
computing professor melted down Gummi 
Bears to make a fake fingerprint that 
successfully fooled a high-end scanner. 
And the Chaos Computer Club in Germany 
recently included a silicone ‘sticky finger’ in 
its magazine with the fingerprint of the 
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German Home Secretary, Wolfgang 
Schaeuble. They had lifted the print from a 
glass. Schaeuble was unimpressed, arguing 
he had “nothing to hide, after all”, but the 
point is clear: any systems – say, a 
perimeter access control system – that 
simply check that the fingerprint presented 
matches one in the database are 
vulnerable to this sort of attack. 
The problems don’t end there. The 
match between the registered biometric 
and the one presented for checking can 
only ever be an approximate one. There 
are many reasons why a legitimate user’s 
biometric might not be recognised as a 
match: lighting conditions can affect face 
and iris capture, a finger may be placed in 
a slightly different position, the reader may 
be too dirty to distinguish ridges.
Putting biometric readers everywhere 
will not improve security – the bad guys 
will find a way round them and many 
ordinary people will be inconvenienced. 
Any security system has to be carefully 
matched to the security threat, and needs 
to be able to work well enough for real 
people in the real world.
Work is about to start on the 2012 
Olympic Park in London – probably the 
first building site in Britain to use biometric 
screening. Each morning, builders turning 
up for work will have their faces and a 
hand scanned to make sure only 
authorised employees can walk through 
the security barriers. And it’s not just the 
Olympic site – biometric tests are springing 
up everywhere. The UK Home Office 
operates mandatory fingerprint checking 
of all visa applicants as “a first line of 
defence against illegal immigration”. In the 
US, biometric equipment has been 
installed at 116 airports, 15 sea ports and 
154 land ports of entry. And in the future, 
the UK Identity and Passport Service will 
capture the face and fingerprints of anyone 
applying for a passport or identity card. 
The use of biometric systems – the most 
common being face, fingerprint, hand and 
iris recognition – has many ardent 
supporters, who argue that biometrics 
significantly improve security. Their unique 
selling point is that they provide a ‘strong 
proof of identity’ – whether a person is 
who they claim to be. With old-style 
passports, a person looking to enter the 
country illegally could use a passport of 
anyone who looked roughly the same. 
With a biometric passport, a border officer 
can verify that the fingerprint on the 
passport matches the fingerprint of the 
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“Biometrics are not a security panacea that will 
single-handedly wipe out all terrorism and crime”
Fingerprint readers can be deceived